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Summary
One of the definitions describes resilience as the “ability of a system, community or 
society to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in 
a timely and efficient manner” [6]. The increasing demand for resilience arises from a 
steadily growing culture of safety as well as emerging threats. Maritime infrastructures 
are also affected by this. This article discusses the relationship between resilience, 
safety and safety objectives using case examples from the maritime domain. Principal 
approaches for the increase of resilience are described and typical indicators used to 
specify and evaluate the performance, to identify risks and to initiate compensation 
measures are explained. A generic process model is proposed to achieve a 
comprehensive, N-dimensional, view on proactive and reactive aspects of resilience 
engineering in relation to the entity’s lifecycle and to external factors such as needs, 
monitors and control mechanisms.
Sažetak
Jedna od definicija opisuje otpornost kao “sposobnost sustava, zajednice ili društva 
da se odupre, apsorbira, prilagodi i oporavi od učinaka opasnosti na pravodoban i 
učinkovit način” [6]. Povećana potreba za otpornošću rezultat je stalno rastuće kulture 
sigurnosti, kao i nadolazećih prijetnji. To utječe i na pomorske infrastrukture. U članku 
se problematizira odnos između otpornosti, sigurnosti i ciljeva sigurnosti na primjerima 
iz pomorstva. Opisani su glavni pristupi povećanju otpornosti, a objašnjeni su tipični 
pokazatelji kojima se koristi za određivanje i procjenu učinka, identificiranje rizika i 
pokretanje kompenzacijskih mjera. Predložen je generički model procesa kako bi se 
postigao sveobuhvatni N-dimenzionalni pogled na proaktivne i reaktivne aspekte 
inženjerstva otpornosti u odnosu prema životnom ciklusu subjekta i na vanjske čimbenike, 
poput potreba, nadzora i kontrolnih mehanizama. 
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1. BACKGROUND / Kontekst
The definition and understanding of what resilience entails 
is dependent on the professional area and technical jargon 
in which the objectives are pursued – either on a technical, 
economical, ecological or social level. The United Nations Office 
for Disaster Risk Reduction defined resilience as “the ability of 
a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, 
absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a 
hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the 
preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and 
functions” [6]. The European Commission considers resilience as 
the “ability of an individual, a household, a community, a country 
or a region to withstand, to adapt, and to quickly recover from 
stresses and shocks” [2].
What these and other definitions have in common is that 
the term resilience is used to formulate two complementary 
requirements: The first requirement focuses on the intended 
resistance of the entity1 to normal conditions. Assuming that 
the design and realisation of the entity is in compliance with the 
specifications, it may be expected that, under normal conditions, 
the entity is able to perform the specified functionality (in 
operation) and to fulfil the performance requirements (Fig. 1). In 
the case of slightly different conditions, e.g. moderate external 
disturbances, more intense traffic, bad weather, or failures of 
single components, the functionality of the entity should be 
ensured with a tolerable reduction in performance. Highly 
degraded conditions as well as increased threats lead to an 
intolerable loss of performance, break down of functionality, or 
in the worst case to the destruction of the entity. The second 
requirement asks for the ability of the entity or superordinate 
system to reduce the adverse impact of such events. 
1Entity is used in the paper as a generalisation for system of systems, services, 
community, society, individual, household, country or region.
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Figure 1 Acceptance criteria for design and operation
Slika 1. Kriteriji prihvatljivosti za projektiranje i rad
Figure2 illustrates complementary ways to increase the 
resilience of an entity. The graph (2.0) shows the typical 
behaviour of an entity: during nominal conditions it fulfils its 
functionality (green), and during abnormal conditions the 
functionality is degraded (yellow) or lost (red). From time to 
time the entity is maintained to keep the functionality on par 
with the supported resistance level. The graph (2.a) shows the 
behaviour of the entity that was improved during maintenance 
and thus has a decreased vulnerability. This case excludes that 
the entity becomes more sensitive to other or new threats 
by modernisation. Representative examples are the use of 
interference and multipath mitigation techniques to increase 
the performance of positioning based on Global Navigation 
Satellite Systems (GNSS) or the implementation of patches to 
protect computers against cyber-attacks. The second method 
is illustrated by the graph (2.b). It should be noted that a 100 
percent working entity is unrealistic because any entity may 
support only a certain level of resilience in relation to the known 
and unknown threats. The design of a system that can withstand 
cascade effects is particularly difficult. One common approach 
to compensate breakdowns of any kind is to equip the entity 
with a backup, which means installing a second functional 
component that is able to perform the same task independently 
from the first, possibly with lower performance. For instance, 
the carriage requirement of a ship to have additional and 
preferably independent navigation sensors is an appropriate 
measure to avoid single sensor failures leading to insufficient 
situational awareness. The graph (2.c) illustrates that resilience 
may also be improved by implementing effective damage 
containment, thus reducing social, ecological or economical 
harms and/or facilitating a fast recovery of the entity after 
the occurrence of disruptive events. A typical example is the 
provision of emergency services to repair and/or recover ships 
where possible.
Resilience Engineering sees itself “as a new way of thinking 
about safety” [4] and establishes also new opportunities for 
the maritime domain [8]. This implies that the objective of 
resilience engineering is maintaining safety. Growing threats 
of terrorism, piracy and crime make it impossible to consider 
safety and security aspects as independent factors. This is quite 
understandable, if we consider the increasing importance of 
cybersecurity for the safety of society and the economy (e.g. 
transport, energy, medical supply). Increasing complexity 
Figure 2 Classical ways to increase the resilience of an entity
Slika 2. Standardni načini povećanja otpornosti subjekta
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and finite resources require an integrated view of all entity 
levels – technological, functional, operational, organisational, 
administrative, as well as regulative – to find out not only new, 
but also more effective ways to strengthen resilience. 
2. SAFETY, SECURITY AND SAFETY OBJECTIVES / 
Sigurnost, zaštita i ciljevi sigurnosti
Most people associate safety with the absence of unwanted 
outcomes such as incidents, accidents or unintended events 
[4]. Therefore, the avoidance of adverse outcomes may be 
considered as the generalised objective of safety, which should 
be achieved with the highest probability that is needed and still 
be acceptable. In a particular case, the fulfilment of safety (as 
well as the non-fulfilment) depends on the specific objective 
of safety taking into account causes andeffects (Fig. 3). For 
example, the objective of occupational safety is the avoidance 
of working accidents.The operational safety of an entity may be 
considered as fulfilled, if at least an interruption-free operation 
is achieved under normal conditions. A higher objective of 
operational safety includes, in addition to interruption-free 
operation, the avoidance of work accidents and the protection 
of the environment. More generally, operational safety of 
an entity is fulfilled if the operation of the entity itself is the 
measure of fulfilled operational safety. The growing complexity 
of entities increases the number and variety of specific targets 
that must be met to achieve the entity’s operational safety. 
The occurrence of anomalies as well as environmental and 
climatic changes require a further strengthening of the entity’s 
components and technologies to ensure that operational safety 
may also be met in the future (Fig. 3: extended operational 
safety). In times of continuous security threats (e.g. terrorism, 
criminality, vandalism) the operational safety of an entity 
increasingly requires the consideration of security-relevant 
issues. These cover the detection and assessment of threats as 
well as the establishment of an effective and coordinated safety 
and security management (Fig. 3: extended operational safety 
and security).
Independently, if the operational safety of a complex 
entity or specific safety/security aspect is to be considered, 
unambiguous measures are needed to formulate and quantify 
the achieved and target level of safety. Data of accidents and 
incidents are often collected on behalf of politicians and 
authorities. Such databases are used to investigate causes of 
accidents, to evaluate their risk potential, as well as to identify 
and prioritise the need for further improvements of the entity. 
For example, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) 
is one of the organisations investigating the occurrence and 
causes of casualties and incidents in the maritime traffic system 
[1]. EMSA defines a casualty as an event directly connected 
with the ships’ operation and the occurrence of death or 
injury to persons, loss and destruction of ships and marine 
infrastructures, stranding and disabling of ships, or pollution 
of and/or damage to the marine habitat. A study shows that 
between 2011 and 2014 the number of casualties has more 
than doubled in Europe [1]. This illustrates the still existing need 
to continue the enhancement of safety at sea including the 
maritime infrastructures. Main causes of casualties (~ 60%) are 
the loss of ship control, collision with floating and fixed objects 
(without grounding), and collision with other traffic participants 
[1]. In hindsight, this makes it difficult to reliably reproduce how 
the causes, effects and events originated and developed, and 
what their interdependencies were. For example, the loss of 
navigation control may be caused by a collision with a floating 
container and could result in a further collision with other traffic 
participants. Alternatively, equipment failure as well as operator 
errors may also be accountable for the loss of navigation control 
and the resulting ship collision. These consideration focus on 
the identification of possible causes that may result in a loss of 
safety. Consequently, measures to enhance safety cover either 
the elimination of possible causes (e.g. increase resilience of the 
propulsion system against operating errors and destruction) 
or the establishment of barriers to mitigate their impact (e.g. 
Figure 3 Safety and security aspects 
Slika 3. Aspekti sigurnosti i zaštite
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training of propulsion operators or implementation of access 
restrictions).
The increasing complexity of entities makes it increasingly 
difficult to consider safety based only on simple cause-effect-
relationships. The use of new technologies, the scarcity of 
personnel resources, and changes in organisational structures 
and responsibilities all add to the emergence of new threats. 
Additionally, the impact and dynamics of known threats (e.g. 
climate change, terrorism) are constantly on the rise. Both 
developments imply that a solely reactive and cause-orientated 
safety management system is inadequate to maintain or 
enhance the safety of entities in the future [4]. Going back to 
the example mentioned above, the probability of colliding with 
floating containers could be reduced by a global network of 
container search and recovery services. However, the probability 
of a collision will never be zero because there will always be 
a certain time lapse between loss and recovery. But a loss of 
navigation control should not necessarily result in an accident. 
Therefore, this safety objective of the ‘system ship’ (no accident) 
may be fulfilled even though the safety objective of the ‘system 
propulsion’ (interruption-free operation) is not given. With 
increasingly complex systems in particular, often referred to 
as ‘system of systems’, it is neither feasible nor affordable for 
all components, systems, and players to meet their individual 
safety objectives. Consequently, entities as well as involved 
stakeholders should be empowered to continuously monitor 
internal and external conditions, to predict developments 
with respect to all event types, and to initiate compensation 
measures in an effective way, if necessary. In this context, the 
human is a very important resource to ensure the operational 
flexibility and resilience of complex entities [4]. 
As discussed in [4], it is not sufficient to derive an entity’s 
functionality from the performance of its individual systems 
and components by considering simple cause-effect-
relationships. The latter allows only the consideration of cases, 
where ”something goes wrong” results in ”unwanted outcomes 
such as incidents or accidents” [4]. A deeper understanding of 
the entity is necessary to achieve a state in which the entity is 
able “to succeed under varying conditions, so that the number 
of intended and acceptable outcomes is as high as possible” 
[4]. This also includes those cases, where ”best practice” and 
flexible acting enable that “something goes wrong” will not 
result in unwanted or disruptive events. Monitoring in real time, 
performance-driven control, as well as continuous situational 
assessment are a few new ways to increase the resilience of an 
entity (see Fig. 4).
The left graph (4.a) illustrates the benefit of integrity 
monitoring and evaluation. This is a measure to determine 
the current status, performance and behaviour of safety-
critical entities, more or less exactly. For this purpose, a set of 
observations and performance parameters are monitored, 
fused and evaluated in real time. In this context alert limits 
act as decision criteria to differ between fulfilment and non-
fulfilment of performance requirements, as well as usability 
and non-usability of the entity and included components. 
These assistance functions provide support to operators and 
users of entities wanting to obtain comprehensive situational 
pictures, avoid misinterpretations of situational pictures, 
and consequently prevent the improper use of the entity.
The establishment of reliable system awareness by intelligent 
integrity monitoring and evaluation is therefore important to 
increase the resilience of safety-critical entities. For example, the 
relation between ice thickness of an ice field and the ice class of a 
ship determines whether crossing the ice field is safe or whether 
it should be circumnavigated. An erroneous estimation of ice 
thickness may result in economic losses (circumnavigation as a 
result of a false alarm) or in hazardously misleading operations 
(crossing the field under increased hazard). As a further example, 
safe transport of passengers should also include the protection 
of passengers against criminal and terrorist attacks at crucial 
points, such as ferry terminals and on board a ferry.The middle 
graph (4.b) illustrates the case in which continuously monitored 
performance parameters are used to describe the current 
situational picture (blue solid line) of the entity and to forecast 
the behaviour of the entity (blue dotted line). If the degradation/
loss of entity functionality can be forecast, sufficient lead time 
may be gained to initiate measures improving resilience by early 
maintenance, timely decommissioning, as well as proactive 
damage containment. This approach requires an extended 
entity model, which supports a parametrised description of the 
situational picture and its changes, including the emergence 
and avoidance of disruptive events. In addition to the need for 
Figure 4 Additional ways to increase the resilience of an entity
Slika 4. Dodatne metode poboljšanja otpornosti subjekta
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correct modelling, the effectiveness of this approach hinges on 
determining the needed parameter with the required accuracy 
and reliability. For example, by monitoring the wear and tear of 
parts it is possible to determine the optimal time for procuring 
spare parts and carrying out maintenance. Likewise, the 
detection of and defence against terrorist attacks require the 
screening of traffic situations above and below the sea surface.
A redundancy of architectural and functional levels allows 
the functionality of an entity to be achieved by alternative 
independent means (right graph 4.c). This increases the 
continuity and reliability of the operational level, albeit 
not perfectly. However, here too, monitoring the systems’ 
performance is an essential prerequisite to achieve an effective 
switching between alternative options by the entity control. 
Using Radio Detection and Ranging (RADAR) and Automatic 
Identification Systems (AIS) as independent and complementary 
information sources is a well-known approach to improve the 
surveillance and assessment of maritime traffic situations as a 
prerequisite for successful collision avoidance. The additional 
and coordinated use of space-based and airborne monitoring 
techniques has become necessary to achieve comprehensive 
situational pictures along coastlines for customs and coast 
guards. All examples shown in Figure 4 illustrate that the 
monitoring of the status, performance and behaviour of 
entities has become more and more important for an effective 
assessment and management to ensure the entity’s resilience in 
relation to diverse objectives. It also highlights that resilience of 
complex systems with a wide range of performance and possible 
emerging threats requires an anticipatory consideration of 
developments and events, both positively and negatively [3].
3. INDICATORS FOR MONITORING AND 
CONTROLLING SAFETY AND SECURITY / Indikatori 
nadzora i kontrole sigurnosti i zaštite
Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) are parameters used to specify 
or indicate the required or achieved capability of an entity. 
KPIs may beeconomical, ecological, social or technological 
parameters, which are considered at specific moments or 
over longer periods of time. They are suitable for describing 
the behaviour of an entity, to formulate targets or to act as 
an indicator, in case something goes wrong. For example: the 
Gross National Product (GNP) is an economic KPI of a society. 
Turnover and profit of a shipping company are typical business 
KPIs, which may be correlated to individual business segments 
(e.g. ship operation, fleet management, and logistic). Associated 
technological KPIs are related to the operational capability 
and reliability of systems, services, and components, as well 
as the means to protect these against any terrorist or criminal 
attack and other harmful influences. For example, the reliable 
operation of information technology in all business segments 
is a safety-relevant KPI; the reliable protection of IT-systems 
against cyber-attacks is a security-relevant KPI. This illustrates 
that KPIs, even though used from different perspectives, often 
depend on each other, and are increasingly affected by safety- 
and security-relevant issues. Consequently, the resilience of an 
entity is measured and specified based on its performance and 
outcomes formulated by KPIs [5]. For example, the Baltic and 
International Maritime Council (BIMCO) developed a KPI system 
as standard for the definition, measurement and reporting on 
the operational performance of ships [7].
In general, a variety of factors determine whether a certain 
KPI of a complex entity can be met. These factors may be specified 
by KPIs of the entity’s components (system of systems approach). 
In our example, an optimal functioning of the IT-systems is an 
essential prerequisite for the turnover and profit of a shipping 
company. When looking at the individual components, these 
factors are rather expressed by internal Performance Parameters 
(iPP) and their associated thresholds (min(iPP),max(iPP)) to 
describe the nominal behaviour of implemented functions. 
Coming back to our example, a seamless and safe operation of 
a ship requires, among other things, the reliable provision of 
all navigation-relevant information. Therefore, the reliable on-
board provision of positional, navigation, and time data (PNT) 
is one of the associated KPIs on the technological level. For 
navigation at open sea it is sufficient to know the ship’s position 
with an uncertainty of a few 10 metres. However, during port 
operation and docking,nautical information (e.g. horizontal or 
three-dimensional attitude of the ship’s hull, electronic nautical 
charts, geo-referenced port infrastructure and topography) 
with greater accuracy is needed to avoid collisions. The current 
application context determines which of the iPPs and thresholds 
should be fulfilled for seamless and safe ship operation. KPIs 
as well as iPPs specify either the “As-Is” (status) or the “To-Be” 
(requirement) of entities taking into account safety as well as 
security aspects. 
Key Risk Identifiers (KRIs) are parameters used to describe 
and evaluate the risk profile of an entity. KPIs as well as iPPs may 
serve to determine KRIs, whether they are suitable to detect 
threats, to estimate the likelihood of occurrence, or to estimate 
and quantify potential impacts and outcomes. Therefore, 
KRIs may also be economic, social, business or technological 
parameters observed over longer periods (to observe trends) 
or instantaneous parameters (to monitor the current status). At 
the latest, if a KRI attains unacceptable values, measures may 
be initiated to retain or recover the entity’s functionality or to 
reduce negative impacts. For this purpose the entity should 
possess absorptive, adaptive and restorative capabilities to be 
resilient [3, 5]. At an operational level the initiation, selection, 
and realisation of absorptive, adaptive and restorative functions 
are controlled by Key Control Identifiers (KCIs), which are used to 
formulate decision-making criteria as well as control parameters. 
However, KCIs may also be used to determine the point in time 
at which a reengineering of the entity becomes inevitable. 
If again we consider “Reliable ship operation” as the KPI of 
interest, then performance degradation and interruptions to 
the provision of on-board PNT data are typical risk indicators for 
a possible decrease in the ship’s operational safety. Depending 
on the magnitude and duration of the performance loss, certain 
KCIs may trigger a switch from automatic to manual operation 
of navigational tasks. If the frequency of such events becomes 
unacceptable, a further KCI may initiate an unscheduled 
maintenance or the reengineering of the on-board PNT system.
4. RESILIENCE ENGINEERING APPROACH / Pristup 
temeljen na inženjerstvu otpornosti
Figure 5 illustrates a way to consider, improve and ensure 
the resilience of maritime infrastructures based on a system-
of-systems approach in a multi or N-dimensional manner 
respectively. The light-blue box represents the considered 
entity, e.g. a port, during its continuous lifecycle. Most 
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major ports today arose many centuries ago to facilitate the 
shipborne trade. Since then social, economic and ecological 
evolution, as well as changes in user needs, have resulted in 
the continuous development and extension of global port 
infrastructures (modelled by the light-green box). For example, 
the establishment of new and greater container terminals in the 
last decades is a result of the continually increasing demand 
for higher transport capacity and efficiency. If the discrepancy 
between achieved and target performance of an entity becomes 
intolerable, the ‘order’ to establish a further entity is triggered 
(e.g. offshore port). 
The establishment of an entity is based on a sequence 
of processes: specification of KPIs and iPPs, development, 
validation, implementation and testing (dark-blue processes), 
whereby validation and testing serves as quality assurance 
during the establishment process. A failed test indicates that KCIs 
have initiated either the re-implementation or the redesign of an 
entity. On the other hand, if the established entity is able to meet 
the operational performance formulated by KPIs and iPPs under 
nominal operational conditions, the test is passed. This covers 
the fulfilment of operational safety as well as the achievement 
of operational targets and the avoidance of negative impact on 
business, staff and environment. An effective mix of internal and 
external monitoring processes (within box I1 and provided by 
E1) assesses the entity’s behaviour, performance and status. If 
any endangerment is identified (KRI’s), the derived KCIs start 
the maintenance or modernisation of the entity. However, 
the monitoring of entities in the global context (E1) may also 
result in new insights, which will reshape the different needs 
in relation to the entities and their operation. For example, the 
provision of power supply systems at terminals is a measure 
of port modernisation that reduces the exhaust emission of 
cruise liners and other vessels during their berthing times. The 
frequency of rapidly changing threats increases and is often 
induced by climatic changes, extreme weather conditions, 
or growing vandalism, crime and terrorism. The monitoring 
of these threats (E2) helps to evaluate whether a redesign is 
necessary to increase the resilience of the entity. The aim of the 
redesign is the improvement of the entity to meet iPPs and KPIs 
for a larger range of operational conditions. The monitoring of a 
threat situation in real time enables to initiate compensation and 
security protection measures (E3) as far as possible, if necessary. 
Such measures in the case of a port may be that port authorities 
deny ships to enter or leave the port during extreme autumn 
storms. An early identification of leakages at LNG terminals 
makes it possible for the disaster management to save lives and 
goods in the port area by fast evacuation of hazard-prone areas. 
If surveillance systems are operated, unauthorised movements 
Figure 5 ResilienceN approach: Comprehensive views on proactive and reactive aspects of resilience engineering
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and safety-critical events may be detected in the port area. This 
helps to avoid any attacks on port infrastructure and operation. 
In extreme cases, where safety and security cannot be ensured 
despite applied resilience measures, the entity should be 
taken out of operation temporarily or permanently. 
The integrated presentation of different processes in 
Figure 5 may suggest that resilience is considered to be a 
technological challenge in this article. It should be noted 
that the specification of key risk indicators and resulting key 
control indicators is generally the task of humans giving due 
consideration to all interests and priorities. However, in these 
times of digitalisation and automation, decision processes 
may also be carried out by machines and processes that are 
conditioned to a certain level of artificial intelligence. 
5. CONCLUSION / Zaključak
On a general level, this article addresses the question of which 
proactive and reactive aspects should be considered to achieve 
a resilient entity. First, classical and new ways to increase the 
resilience of an entity were presented followed by the definition 
of indicators that can be used to monitor and control the safety 
and security on a system-of-systems level. Finally, the so-
called resilienceN approach was presented in order to define a 
model-based comprehensive view on proactive and reactive 
aspects of resilience engineering, covering not only internal 
but also external factors. Our intention is to use this toolkit 
for the development and optimizationof resilience concepts 
for different safety-critical maritime infrastructures. As shown, 
it is important to specify and evaluate the level of an entity’s 
resilience using KPIs, iPPs, and KRIs in real time as well as for 
longer periods of time. Our next step towards comprehensive 
situational surveying of entities is the development of status 
models needs to be pursued to enable the monitoring of 
emerging risks and for early initiation of compensation and 
defence measures, if necessary.
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